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Abstract
Increasing emissions from road transport is a growing concern for planners and
policy makers. Concurrently, congestion is another major issue which affects user be-
havior, escalates emissions and other externalities, and thus, reduces system welfare.
Recent contributions in the literature investigated the interrelationship between con-
gestion and emission levels, and find them to be positively correlated. However, most
studies focus on pricing strategies to mitigate one isolated externality, and examine
impacts on the other externality. This paper continues this line of research by inves-
tigating the effect of congestion pricing on emission levels, and the effect of emission
pricing on congestion levels for a large-scale case study of Sioux Falls (South Dakota,
US). Going beyond existing studies, the paper then proposes a joint optimization
approach of internalizing both externalities simultaneously, and analyzes the effect
of different available choice dimensions for users (route, mode, and departure time
choice) on the results. The findings for separate pricing of the externalities are in line
with the literature, and indicate a positive correlation between congestion and emis-
sions. Furthermore, it is found that simultaneous pricing of congestion and emissions
yields a higher increase in system welfare than separate pricing of only one external-
ity. Mode choice turns out to be the determining factor of this welfare change, and
therefore needs to be included in the transport model. Finally, the case study shows
that simply combining the toll levels obtained from the separate pricing strategies
will most likely result in tolls above the economic optimum, and thus, reduce overall
welfare.
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1 Introduction
Road congestion is a widespread phenomenon across the world and in particular present
in metropolitan areas where travel demand is high and capacities are naturally limited by
scarce urban space. The expected increase in traffic mainly resulting from urbanization
processes is likely to increase negative externalities1 such as road congestion, damage to
the environment, and human health (see, e.g., Weinreich et al., 1998; Maibach et al.,
2008). These externalities yield efficiency losses which can sum up to a significant part of
a country’s GDP (Gross Domestic Product). For example, a study by Creutzig and He
(2009) indicates that the total external costs by motorized traffic in Beijing range between
7.5% and 15% of GDP. For the total external costs in the EU-27, Becker et al. (2012) find
them to annually reach 373 billion EUR – equivalent to 3.0% of the region’s GDP.
Congestion externalities occur, since every vehicle on the network imposes costs on
other vehicles in terms of increased travel time. These costs are not compensated by any
market mechanism, and are therefore not considered in people’s decisions. The theory on
time allocation suggests that an affected person explicitly loses utility from travel time
which e.g. depends on comfort and pleasantness of the transport mode. Additionally, that
person implicitly loses time as a resource, which could be used to perform a beneficial
activity (Jara-Dı´az, 2007; Bo¨rjesson and Eliasson, 2014).
Exhaust emission externalities occur, since vehicular traffic emits significant emission
pollutants like carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NOx), particular matter (PM),
sulfur dioxide (SO2) etc., which are the main components for polluting air and these in
turn are responsible for adverse effects on health and living conditions. However, these
adverse effects on others are typically not considered in people’s mobility decisions.
In order to correct for these market failures, planners and policy makers may look for
measures which reduce the efficiency loss caused by the negative externalities. One option
in this context is to aim for behavioral changes of people which increase the efficiency of
the system. From the economic literature it is known that internalizing external effects
by a tax can increase overall welfare to society (Pigou, 1920). This lead to many studies
1 ‘Externality’ will in this paper be used as a synonym of ‘negative externality’ unless otherwise stated.
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on road pricing which all focus on finding the theoretically optimal tolls for road con-
gestion (Lindsey and Verhoef, 2001; Small and Verhoef, 2007; Vickrey, 1969; Henderson,
1974; Arnott et al., 1993). However, there is only a limited number of contributions that
aimed at finding optimal toll levels for emissions (see, e.g., Kickho¨fer and Nagel, 2013)
or for emissions and congestion simultaneously (see, e.g. Wang et al., 2014; Proost and
van Dender, 2001). The former solve the problem using a simulation-based optimization
for large-scale scenarios considering dynamic traffic flows. The latter use an analytical
approach for a small six-node network, and a large-scale scenario of Brussels (Belgium)
with static traffic flows, respectively. None of these studies attempted marginal social cost
pricing for congestion and emissions in a large-scale scenario with dynamic traffic flows
and activity-based demand.
More practically oriented contributions investigate the impact of various pricing strate-
gies on congestion and emission levels (see, e.g. Beamon and Griffin, 1999; Daniel and
Bekka, 2000; Proost and van Dender, 2001; Beevers and Carslaw, 2005; Namdeo and
Mitchell, 2008; Barth and Boriboonsomsin, 2009). They all find that their pricing strate-
gies will influence congestion patterns and emissions in the same direction. Hence, there
is strong empirical evidence that these two externalities are positively correlated.
In the first step, the present study continues this line of research by investigating the
effect of congestion pricing on emission levels, and the effect of emission pricing on con-
gestion levels. For that purpose, the marginal congestion pricing approach by Kaddoura
and Kickho¨fer (2014) and the marginal emission pricing approach by Kickho¨fer and Nagel
(2013) are applied to Sioux Falls (South Dakota, US).
In the second step, the study extends the existing literature by applying a combined
marginal social cost approach for automobile emissions and congestion. Because of the
above correlation between congestion and emissions, the hypothesis is that simply com-
bining the toll levels obtained from the separate pricing strategies will result in tolls above
the economic optimum. Hence, the contribution of the combined approach is to determine
individual vehicle-specific, time-dependent toll levels that include both externalities under
consideration. Additionally, it is tested how much of the overall impact results from the
possibility for travelers to change their mode, i.e. whether setting optimal car prices with-
out considering the alternative mode is a valid approach for such policy design. The results
are optimal emission-congestion levels for a particular case study. The methodology that
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is developed can, however, be applied to any scenario worldwide.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 explains the transport
simulation framework that is used for this study, and presents methodology of internalizing
external congestion and emission effects within this framework. Sec. 3 presents the various
scenarios in this study and their input parameters. Further, Sec. 4 demonstrates the
comparison between different scenarios and various other results. Finally, Sec. 5 concludes
the study by summarizing the main findings.
2 Methodology
2.1 MATSim
The multi-agent transport simulation MATSim2 is used for all simulation runs. Detailed
information about the software has been published e.g. by Balmer et al. (2009, 2005);
Raney and Nagel (2004, 2006). The main idea of MATSim is to provide a framework
for simulating transport in large-scale scenarios. Minimal inputs are network data, daily
plans of individual travelers, and simulation configuration parameters. Every individual is
considered as an agent who learns within an iterative process that is composed of following
three steps:
1. Plans Execution - All selected plans are executed simultaneously using predefined
mobility simulations. In this study, a state-of-the-art queuing model (Gawron, 1998;
Cetin et al., 2003) is used.
2. Plans Evaluation - To compare various plans, executed plans are evaluated using
a utility function. A plan’s utility (Vplan) is represented by:
Vplan =
n∑
i=1
(Vperf ,i + Vtravel,i) , (1)
where n is the number of activities, Vperf ,i is the utility from performing activity
i and Vtravel,i is the (typically negative) utility for traveling to activity i. Utility
earned for performing an activity following Charypar and Nagel (2005) is given by:
Vperf ,i(tperf ,i) = βperf . t∗,i . ln(
tperf ,i
t0,i
) , (2)
2 See www.matsim.org
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where tperf and t∗ are the actual performed and typical duration of the activity,
respectively. βperf is the marginal utility of performing an activity at its typical
duration which is the same for all activities, since in the equilibrium, all activities
at their typical duration need to have the same marginal utility. t0,i is a scaling
parameter that is related both to the minimum duration and to the importance of
an activity. As long as dropping activities from the plan is not allowed, t0,i has
essentially no effect. Mode-specific utility from traveling by car or public transport
(PT) following Kickho¨fer et al. (2013) is given by:
Vcar,i = βtr,car . ti,car + βc .ci,car
Vpt,i = β0 + βtr,pt . ti,pt + βc .ci,pt ,
(3)
where ti is the travel time of a trip to activity i and ci is the corresponding monetary
cost. Travel times and monetary costs dependent on travel mode as indicated by
the indices (‘car’ and ‘pt’). The behavioral parameters (βperf , βtr,car, βtr,pt and βc)
used in the present study are listed in Tab. 1. β0 is an alternative specific constant
which is in present study set to zero during base case set up (see Sec. 3.2).
3. Re-planning - For the next iteration, a new plan is generated for some of the agents
by modifying an existing plan’s attributes. These modifications are performed by
software modules that can be defined arbitrarily. The most common modules change
the route, departure time, or mode of a trip.
By repeatedly performing the steps from above, an iterative process is initiated which
finally results in stabilized simulation outputs.
Table 1: Utility parameters used for all simulation runs. Source: Kaddoura et al. (2015).
Parameter Value Unit
Marginal utility of monetary cost (βc) – 0.062 utils/EUR
Marginal utility of performing (βperf ) + 0.96 utils/h
Marginal utility of traveling by car (βtr,car) – 0.00 utils/h
Marginal utility of traveling by PT (βtr,pt) – 0.18 utils/h
Value of Travel Time Savings car (V TTScar) 15.48 EUR/h
Value of Travel Time Savings PT (V TTSpt) 18.39 EUR/h
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2.2 Emission pricing
The emission modeling tool was developed by Hu¨lsmann et al. (2011) and further improved
and extended by Kickho¨fer et al. (2013). This tool is used along with the MATSim
framework. Currently, emissions are calculated for free flow and stop&go traffic states.
Emissions consist of cold emissions (during warm up phase of vehicle) and warm emissions
(while driving); cold emissions essentially depend on parking duration, distance traveled,
and vehicle characteristics; warm emissions depend on engine type, road category, and
speed of the vehicle. Thus, cold and warm emissions for each agent on each link are
calculated using the HBEFA3 database.
Furthermore, Kickho¨fer and Nagel (2013) developed a method to calculate time-dependent,
vehicle-specific emission tolls. In this method, person and link-specific time-dependent
emissions are converted into monetary units (emissions costs) using emission cost factors
given in Tab. 2. In the simulation, every time an agent leaves a link, the agent conse-
quently pays the monetary equivalent of the produced emissions. Within the iterative
learning cycle (see Sec. 2.1), the agents learn how to react on these individual tolls, and
might change their behavior accordingly. This is referred to a internalizing the external
emission effect (see later in Sec. 2.4).
Table 2: Emission cost factors. Source: Maibach et al. (2008).
Emission type Cost factor (EUR/ton)
CO2 70
NMHC 1700
NOx 9600
PM 384500
SO2 11000
2.3 Congestion pricing
The framework to compute individual delays and then to internalize those by a marginal
social cost pricing scheme in an agent-based simulation is provided by Kaddoura and
Kickho¨fer (2014). This tool is also used along with the MATSim framework. Route and
3 ‘Handbook Emission Factors for Road Transport’, Version 3.1, see www.hbefa.net
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travel time tracking of all agents provides the dis-aggregated delays4 and allows to identify
the delay causing agents. The latter can therefore be charged with the equivalent monetary
amount of the delays they caused for other agents. Since congestion is – in contrast to
emissions – inherent to road traffic, the behavioral parameters from Tab. 1 can directly
be used to convert delays into monetary units. This is done using the Value of Travel
Time Savings (VTTS) of the car mode.5 Again, the monetary payments are considered
in the utility-based learning cycle of MATSim, and, hence, the external congestion effect
is internalized.
2.4 Internalization
Internalization is the process by which external costs are included into the behavioral deci-
sion making of individuals by setting prices for these effects. At first, the MATSim utility
functions only incorporate marginal private costs (MPC) which correspond to spending
time and money for traveling to planned activities (see Eq. 1 and Eq. 3). Marginal social
costs (MSC) can be called as sum of MPC and marginal external costs (MEC) (see, e.g.
Walters, 1961; Turvey, 1963). The external component can result from any of the exter-
nalities mentioned in Sec. 1. This study attempts to compute MEC for different scenarios
listed in Tab. 3, and then set prices accordingly in order to improve the efficiency of the
transport system. In the Base case and the “Business As Usual” (BAU) scenario, no exter-
nalities are internalized. Thus, utility from traveling to an activity is given by Eq. 3. For
all other scenarios, the price of emissions and/or congestion is added to the overall utility
of every trip. When internalizing emission and congestion of car traffic jointly (ECI), the
utility of traveling to an activity is given by:
Vcar,i = βtr,car · ti,car + βc · (ci,car + cemission,i + ccongestion,i) , (4)
where ci are the MPC related to car use (fuel, potentially insurance and tax); and cemission,i
and ccongestion,i represent the monetary equivalents of the respective external effect of that
trip on society obtained by the methodology from Sec. 2.2 and Sec. 2.3, respectively.
4 Delay is in this study defined by the difference between the actual travel time on a link and the link’s
free flow travel time. That is, delays are calculated on a per-link basis and not for entire routes.
5 The VTTS is definded as the individual willingness-to-pay for reducing the travel time by one hour.
For a linear utility functions, it is the ratio of the marginal utility of travel time and the marginal utility
of monetary cost. As mentioned earlier, the former is the sum of the disutility for traveling (βtr) and the
negative utility of time as a resource (−βperf ).
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3 Case study
3.1 Inputs
To see the impacts of various internalization schemes, the well-known scenario of Sioux
Falls city, South Dakota, United States, is chosen. It has been introduced by LeBlanc
et al. (1975), and has just recently been converted into a MATSim scenario by Chakirov
and Fourie (2014). Their initial population consists of 84’110 agents, each with one plan;
78.18% of the agents use car and the rest use PT. In the present study, only car mode
is considered when computing emission and congestion externalities. PT travelers are
teleported between activity locations and travel time for traveling between these activities
is the product of free speed car travel time between activity locations and configurable
teleportation mode specific factor.
Detailed raw road network for Sioux Falls is taken from OSM6 and then converted
into the MATSim XML format. It contains 5’032 nodes and 13’550 links (see Fig. 1).
Important behavioral parameters are listed in Tab. 1.
3.2 Base case set up
Initially, a base case is set up by running the simulation for 500 iterations to stabilize
travel demand. This is done by setting all alternating specific constants to zero, and
thereafter varying the teleportation speed factor for PT in order to match the initial
modal split distribution over distance from Chakirov and Fourie (2014).7 The result of
this calibration exercise is a teleportation speed factor of 2.65, which means that traveling
by PT takes 2.65 times as long as traveling by car in an empty network.
3.3 Policy scenarios
Four policy scenarios (Tab. 3) are then simulated with different available choice dimensions:
(1) mode choice enabled (MCE) and (2) mode choice disabled (MCD). The selected plans
from the final iteration of base case are then reused in all scenarios as input plans. Each
policy scenario is run for 500 iterations. For 80% of the iterations, agents are allowed to
switch route, mutate departure time, and change travel mode, each with a re-planning
6 Open Street Map, see http://www.openstreetmap.org
7 The initial modal split (car : PT) was 78.18 : 21.82; the modal split after calibration is 79.66 : 20.34.
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Figure 1: Sioux Falls network. Source: www.openstreetmap.org ( c© OpenStreetMap contributors).
probability of 10%. The rest of the agents chose plans according to a multinomial logit
model. After 80% of the iterations, all agents chose plans from their generated choice set
according to a multinomial logit model. As described in Sec. 2.4, different user-specific
external costs are internalized for the scenarios listed in Tab. 3. PT is assumed to run
emission free and as a without capacity constraints. Therefore, there is no emission and
congestion externality for PT. Emission costs, congestion costs and toll payments for all
four scenarios are computed.
Emissions costs Time-dependent and person-specific cold and warm emissions are cal-
culated as described in Sec. 2.2. These emissions are then transformed into monetary units
using emissions costs factors (see Tab. 2). These monetary emissions costs are summed
up to get total emissions costs in each scenario.
9
Congestion costs As illustrated in Sec. 2.3, dis-aggregated delays are calculated for
each causing agent and then converted into monetary units using the VTTS. Afterwards,
these values are summed up to get the total congestion costs for each scenario. Addition-
ally, and in order to perform welfare analysis, user benefits are calculated by converting
the utility of selected plans of each agent into monetary terms (for the methodology of
converting individual utility levels into money terms for project assessment, see Kickho¨fer,
2014). Congestion costs and the negative perception of toll payments are both part of user
benefits. Consequently, changes in social welfare is defined as the algebraic sum of changes
in emission costs, toll payments, and user benefits. That is, toll payments are simply a
transfer payment from users to some public authority. In the following, results of BAU,
EI, CI and ECI are compared and discussed.
Table 3: Policy scenarios
Scenario Internalization method
Business As Usual (BAU) none
Emissions Internalization (EI) see Sec. 2.2
Congestion Internalization (CI) see Sec. 2.3
Emissions and Congestion Internalization (ECI) see Sec. 2.2 and Sec. 2.3
4 Results
The results obtained from comparing the policy scenarios with respect to the BAU scenario
are shown in Tab. 4. It depicts changes in emissions costs, delays costs, user benefits, and
system welfare. Additionally, Tab. 5 provides insights into the modal shift induced by the
different policies. The analysis is composed of two steps: First, in Sec. 4.1, the left column
of the results is discussed where users can – in addition to departure time choice and route
choice – also change transport mode. Second, in Sec. 4.2, the right column of the results
is discussed where mode choice is not available for agents when reacting to the pricing
schemes. The idea behind this comparison is (i) to investigate how the internalization of
one externality influences the other externality, and (ii) to test the hypothesis whether
the correlation between the two externalities in the combined internalization (ECI) yields
toll levels that are lower than the algebraic sum of the toll levels from the individual
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internalization models. Additionally, it is analyzed how much of the overall impact results
from the possibility for travelers to change mode, i.e. whether setting optimal car prices
without considering the alternative mode is a valid approach for such policy design.
Table 4: Change in emissions, delays, welfare for all scenarios with respect to BAU
Mode choice enabled (MCE) disabled (MCD)
Scenario EI CI ECI EI CI ECI
Change in emissions costs -8.27% -0.71% -9.40% -0.07% -0.12% -0.18%
Change in delays costs -15.42% -60.55% -81.33% -4.63% -34.49% -34.13%
Toll payments 9138.02 3426.81 10648.35 9899.37 1189.55 11083.9
Change in user benefits -0.026% 0.003% -0.016% -0.030% -0.002% -0.033%
Change in system welfare 0.005% 0.014% 0.020% 0.000% 0.001% 0.001%
Table 5: Modal split
Initial Plans 78.18 (car) 21.82 (PT)
Base Case 79.66 (car) 20.34 (PT)
Mode choice enabled (MCE) disabled (MCD)
Travel Modes car PT car PT
BAU 79.71 20.29
EI 73.42 26.58 79.66 20.34
CI 79.38 20.61
ECI 72.88 27.12
4.1 Mode choice enabled
In the BAU scenario, absolute emission costs amount to 9961.92 EUR. Congestion costs
sum up to 8715.16 EUR. That is, in the Sioux Falls scenario, emission and congestion
costs are roughly at the same level. This is not in line with estimates from the literature
where congestion costs represent a major part of the total external effects of road traffic
(see, e.g., Maibach et al., 2008; Parry and Small, 2005). This indicates that the demand
by Chakirov and Fourie (2014) combined with the network from OSM (and also with their
initial network) is unlikely to represent real-world conditions. Hence, testing the approach
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in a real-world setup seems to be an important step after the present study. However,
given the artificial structure of the current setup, it is still suitable in order to test the
proposed internalization strategies. Only the interpretation of the exact figures needs to
be done carefully. The main findings for the MCE case studies are:
• For EI, CI and ECI scenario, reductions in emission costs are 8.27%, 0.71%, and
9.4% respectively. That is, the combined approach yields the highest reductions in
emission costs, closely followed by a pure emission cost internalization. Internalizing
congestion, however, does not substantially reduces emissions.
• For the same strategies, reductions in delays costs are 15.42%, 60.55%, and 81.33%
respectively.8 Again, the combined approach yields the highest reductions of delay
costs, followed by a pure congestion cost internalization. Internalizing emissions (EI)
also reduces congestion to some extend, which supports the findings by Kickho¨fer
and Nagel (2013).
• User benefits in case of EI and ECI decrease because users are paying more toll
than they gain from reductions in emissions and delays. Interestingly, this is not the
case in the CI scenario, where users gain more in terms of utility than they pay in
terms of tolls. That is, a pure congestion internalization yields a positive effect on
society before considering additional benefits that could evolve from investing the
toll payments in a meaningful way.
• System welfare is highest in the ECI scenario where, emission costs and delay costs
are least among the four scenarios. Clearly, simultaneous pricing produces better
results with respect to the reduction of total externalities.
• The sum of toll payments for the separate pricing strategies is higher than for the
simultaneous pricing strategy. This supports the original hypothesis.
• More users shift their travel modes in EI and ECI than for CI (see Tab. 5). This
means that pricing emissions results – for the current setup – in a strong modal shift
8 Compared to the changes in emission costs, these numbers seem rather high. This is, however, due
to the fact that delays can actually be avoided (e.g. by shifting enough individuals to PT or to different
departure times), whereas emission costs can only be avoided by shifting all individuals to PT, or by
changing completely to zero emission vehicles which is not considered in this study.
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towards PT. In contrast, pricing congestion seems to shift people rather to different
departure periods. This can be observed in Fig. 4a where emissions are increased
in early and later hours of the day. Also, this is supported by Fig. 2a, where for CI
(green line with ‘+’), the number of trips of non-peak hour activity end timesrises
more importantly than for EI and ECI (red and yellow lines with ‘+’).
4.2 Mode choice disabled
In the BAU scenario, absolute emission costs amount to 9905.95 EUR. Congestion costs
sum up to 1825.56 EUR. Again, emission costs being more important than congestion costs
indicates that the scenario setup is not reflecting real-world conditions. Congestion costs
in BAU scenario of MCE (8715.16 EUR) are significantly higher than in BAU scenario of
MCD (1825.56 EUR) even though car shares for these two scenarios (79.71% and 79.66%)
are not too different. This substantial difference in congestion costs is because of a rise
in the number of car trips after turning off plans innovation in BAU scenario of MCE.9
Thus, average travel time soars for car trips. Clearly, after turning off plans innovation,
car trips are more attractive than PT. Also, it is noticed that in BAU scenario of MCD,
trips with shorter travel time increased and trips with longer travel time decreased with
respect to base case, unlike in BAU scenario of MCE. In consequence, congestion costs
in BAU scenario of MCE is significantly higher than in MCD. The main findings for the
MCD case studies are:
• For EI, CI, and ECI scenario, reductions in emission costs are 0.07%, 0.12%, and
0.18%. The combined internalization approach again yields the highest reductions,
even though the overall reduction is rather weak compared to the MCE scenarios
from above. It highlights the fact that the biggest part of emission reductions can be
obtained by shifting travel mode to PT. Consequently, limiting the available choice
dimensions to departure time and route choice only yields very inelastic demand
when pricing emissions (missing substitutes). Hence, the pricing strategy does not
seem very promising.
• For the same strategies, congestion costs are reduced by 4.63%, 34.49% and 34.13%,
9 After 900 iterations, 22’142 agents have PT as travel mode in their selected plan and after 1000
iterations, such plans are only 17’069.
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(a) MCE
(b) MCD
Figure 2: Leg mode activity end time difference distribution with respect to base case
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respectively. Again, the reductions are lower than for the MCE scenarios but are still
significant. This means that price elasticities of demand are also more inelastic than
in the MCE cases, but time mutation and route choice still allow for improvements
in the transport system. See Fig. 2b, where peak hour activity end times are reduced
and non-peak hours activity end times are increased; also in Fig. 4b, where emissions
are increased in non-peak hours due to shift in travel demand to non-peak hours.
Since initial emission costs are five times higher than congestion costs, reducing
emissions is dominating the choices of individuals in the combined internalization
(ECI).
• The Sioux Falls network does not offer many routes that differ substantially in terms
of distance (see Fig. 3). Only few trips are shifted from longer routes to shorter routes
or vice versa.
• The change in user benefits is negative for the all three scenarios, since users are
losing more from the toll payments than they gain from reduced travel times. In
consequence, system welfare remains almost same as in BAU for all three strategies.
Again, this is due to the fact that the MCD models lack in real alternatives for
users. Pricing in a constraint environment without offering substitutes is typically
not improving the efficiency of the system (see, e.g., Daniel and Bekka, 2000, who
show that the smaller the demand elasticity the lower the potential welfare gain from
pricing strategies).
• The algebraic sum of toll payments for the separate pricing strategies is almost equal
to the toll payments for the simultaneous pricing. This would mean that the initial
hypothesis needs to be rejected. However, this is likely to be related to the above
argument of pricing strategies to be ineffective in constraint environments.
5 Conclusion
This paper applied an agent-based emission internalization strategy developed by Kickho¨fer
and Nagel (2013), and an agent-based congestion internalization strategy developed by
Kaddoura and Kickho¨fer (2014) to Sioux Falls (South Dakota, US). It was investigated
how the internalization of one externality affects the other externality, and how the respec-
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Figure 3: Leg mode route distance difference distribution for MCD
tive pricing mechanism influences user benefits and social welfare when users can react by
changing their departure times and routes (MCD scenarios). Additionally, in the MCE
scenarios, users were also allowed to change transport mode. The key findings for the
separate internalization strategies are (i) that internalizing one externality has a positive
impact on the reduction of the other externality (ii) that unlike internalizing emissions,
internalizing congestion results in positive user welfare because utility gains (by reduction
in travel time) are over-compensating toll payments (iii) that internalizing externalities
improves system welfare only if demand is elastic enough.
The paper then extended the existing literature by running a simultaneous internal-
ization strategy for emissions and congestion (ECI). The hypothesis was that optimal toll
levels from the ECI strategy are lower than the algebraic sum of the individual optimiza-
tion models (EI and CI) because emissions and congestion are to some extend correlated.
The key findings for simultaneous internalization strategies are (i) that internalizing emis-
sions and congestion results in least emission and congestion levels even when demand is
inelastic (ii) that, in consequence, this strategy provides the strongest in system welfare
(iii) that the algebraic sum of toll payments from EI and CI is higher than those of ECI;
in consequence simply combining the toll levels obtained from EI and CI will most likely
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(a) CI of MCE (b) CI of MCD
Figure 4: Hourly % change in emissions and congestion for CI scenarios on Sioux Falls network
result in tolls above the economic optimum, and thus, reduce overall welfare.
Overall, it can be concluded that with the methodology developed in this paper, effi-
cient prices for negative externalities in urban areas can be derived. The approach also
proved to be applicable for a large-scale scenario, and it can therefore be used to create
benchmarks when evaluating the effects of real-world policies. The setup of the Sioux
Falls scenario, however, seems rather artificial. Travel demand consists mainly of local
traffic which results in a rather uncongested network (especially on the major tangential
motorways), and price elasticities of demand are dominated by mode choice. It therefore
seems important to test the methodology in further studies with real-world scenarios. Ad-
ditionally, pricing emission exposure rather than emissions similar to Kickho¨fer and Kern
(2014) seems promising, since toll levels then additionally depend on the number of af-
fected individuals. This could potentially influence the price elasticity of emissions, since
routing would – in such setup – offer more possibilities to reduce emission tolls than in
the current setup with flat tolls per gram of pollutant.
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